docs+fix: resolve Section 14 app-security gaps with real code review (#162)
Verified SSRF protection is actually wired in (webhook dispatcher + model field validation), confirmed CSRF is genuinely N/A (zero cookie usage anywhere), confirmed MCP/SSE auth correctly uses the same MSign mechanism with per-privileged-action enforcement.
Real finding: MSign's per-request signing only enforces a 30s freshness window, not true single-use replay protection - no nonce/dedup tracking exists for it, unlike the separate auth-challenge and MPay flows that do have single-use nonces. Corrected the docstring's misleading 'replay protection' framing to describe what it actually does. Not fixing the underlying gap in this pass - the real fix (a dedup cache) needs careful design given the performance cost of a check on every authenticated request and the blue/green instance topology.
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