"""Phase 2.1 — Path traversal security tests.

Covers every attack vector identified in the muse-powered security recon:

1. validate_workspace_path / validate_path_prefix — unit tests for the new
   validation primitives that gate all workspace-relative path inputs.
2. hash-object — special-file guard (named pipes, sockets), null-byte
   injection, symlink following (documented behaviour), very long paths.
3. ls-files --path-prefix — null-byte and glob metacharacter injection.
4. check-attr — traversal sequences, null bytes, absolute paths, control
   characters, CRLF-poisoned stdin, very long paths.
5. check-ignore — same surface as check-attr.
6. verify-object --stdin — CRLF line endings must not embed \\r in IDs.
7. apply_mpack / unpack-objects — zip-slip attack via malicious manifest keys;
   malicious object IDs in pack bundles.

Design principles
-----------------
- Every test is hermetic: uses tmp_path, writes only what it needs.
- No datetime.now() — pinned UTC timestamps wherever commits are needed.
- No synthetic IDs — compute_commit_id / compute_snapshot_id used throughout.
- Stress: 10 000-path batch, 100 000-char path, 100-entry malicious manifest.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import datetime
import json
import os
import pathlib
import sys

import pytest

from tests.cli_test_helper import CliRunner
from muse.core.errors import ExitCode
from muse.core.object_store import write_object
from muse.core.mpack import MPack, SnapshotDeltaDict, apply_mpack
from muse.core.ids import hash_commit as compute_commit_id, hash_snapshot as compute_snapshot_id
from muse.core.commits import (
    CommitRecord,
    write_commit,
)
from muse.core.snapshots import (
    SnapshotRecord,
    write_snapshot,
)
from muse.core.validation import (
    validate_path_prefix,
    validate_workspace_path,
)
from muse.core.types import Manifest, blob_id, fake_id, long_id
from muse.core.paths import heads_dir, muse_dir

cli = None  # argparse migration — CliRunner ignores this
runner = CliRunner()

_REPO_ID = "security-test"
_BASE_DT = datetime.datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Repo helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


def _init_repo(root: pathlib.Path) -> pathlib.Path:
    dot_muse = muse_dir(root)
    for d in ("commits", "snapshots", "objects", "refs/heads"):
        (dot_muse / d).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    (dot_muse / "HEAD").write_text("ref: refs/heads/main", encoding="utf-8")
    (dot_muse / "repo.json").write_text(
        json.dumps({"repo_id": _REPO_ID, "domain": "generic"}), encoding="utf-8"
    )
    return root


def _make_commit(root: pathlib.Path, idx: int = 0, parent_id: str | None = None) -> str:
    manifest: Manifest = {f"file_{idx}.py": "a" * 64}
    snap_id = compute_snapshot_id(manifest)
    write_snapshot(root, SnapshotRecord(snapshot_id=snap_id, manifest=manifest))
    dt = _BASE_DT + datetime.timedelta(hours=idx)
    parent_ids = [parent_id] if parent_id else []
    commit_id = compute_commit_id(
        parent_ids=parent_ids,
        snapshot_id=snap_id,
        message=f"commit {idx}",
        committed_at_iso=dt.isoformat(),
    )
    write_commit(root, CommitRecord(
        commit_id=commit_id, branch="main",
        snapshot_id=snap_id, message=f"commit {idx}", committed_at=dt,
        parent_commit_id=parent_id,
    ))
    (heads_dir(root) / "main").write_text(commit_id, encoding="utf-8")
    return commit_id


def _env(root: pathlib.Path) -> Manifest:
    return {"MUSE_REPO_ROOT": str(root)}


# ===========================================================================
# 1. validate_workspace_path — unit tests
# ===========================================================================


class TestValidateWorkspacePath:
    def test_valid_simple_path(self) -> None:
        assert validate_workspace_path("tracks/drums.mid") == "tracks/drums.mid"

    def test_valid_filename_only(self) -> None:
        assert validate_workspace_path("README.md") == "README.md"

    def test_valid_with_dots_in_name(self) -> None:
        assert validate_workspace_path("src/my.module.py") == "src/my.module.py"

    def test_valid_with_tab(self) -> None:
        # Tab is the only non-printable char we allow.
        assert validate_workspace_path("path\twith\ttabs") == "path\twith\ttabs"

    def test_rejects_empty(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="empty"):
            validate_workspace_path("")

    def test_rejects_null_byte(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="null byte"):
            validate_workspace_path("foo\x00bar")

    def test_rejects_null_byte_prefix_injection(self) -> None:
        """Classic null-byte injection: foo\\x00../../etc/passwd."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="null byte"):
            validate_workspace_path("tracks/song.mid\x00../../etc/passwd")

    def test_rejects_dotdot_relative(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="traversal"):
            validate_workspace_path("../../../etc/passwd")

    def test_rejects_dotdot_in_middle(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="traversal"):
            validate_workspace_path("tracks/../../../etc/passwd")

    def test_rejects_dotdot_alone(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="traversal"):
            validate_workspace_path("..")

    def test_rejects_absolute_posix(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="absolute"):
            validate_workspace_path("/etc/passwd")

    def test_rejects_absolute_windows_backslash(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="absolute"):
            validate_workspace_path("\\windows\\path")

    def test_rejects_windows_drive_letter(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="absolute"):
            validate_workspace_path("C:\\Users\\malicious")

    def test_rejects_control_character_cr(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control character"):
            validate_workspace_path("foo\rbar")

    def test_rejects_control_character_lf(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control character"):
            validate_workspace_path("foo\nbar")

    def test_rejects_control_character_esc(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control character"):
            validate_workspace_path("foo\x1bbar")

    def test_rejects_ansi_escape_sequence(self) -> None:
        """ESC[31m — terminal colour injection."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control character"):
            validate_workspace_path("\x1b[31mmalicious\x1b[0m")

    def test_rejects_very_long_path(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too long"):
            validate_workspace_path("a/" * 2500)  # > 4096 chars

    def test_accepts_path_at_max_length(self) -> None:
        # 4096 chars exactly — must pass.
        p = "a" * 4096
        assert validate_workspace_path(p) == p

    def test_rejects_path_one_over_max(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too long"):
            validate_workspace_path("a" * 4097)


# ===========================================================================
# 2. validate_path_prefix — unit tests
# ===========================================================================


class TestValidatePathPrefix:
    def test_valid_prefix(self) -> None:
        assert validate_path_prefix("src/") == "src/"

    def test_valid_empty_prefix(self) -> None:
        # Empty prefix matches everything — it's a valid no-op filter.
        assert validate_path_prefix("") == ""

    def test_rejects_null_byte(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="null byte"):
            validate_path_prefix("src/\x00malicious")

    def test_rejects_glob_star(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="glob metacharacters"):
            validate_path_prefix("src/*.py")

    def test_rejects_glob_question(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="glob metacharacters"):
            validate_path_prefix("src/?")

    def test_rejects_glob_bracket(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="glob metacharacters"):
            validate_path_prefix("src/[ab]")

    def test_rejects_control_character(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control character"):
            validate_path_prefix("src/\x1b[malicious")


# ===========================================================================
# 3. hash-object — special-file guard, null bytes, symlinks, long paths
# ===========================================================================


class TestHashObjectSecurity:
    def test_rejects_named_pipe(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """A named pipe (FIFO) must be rejected — opening it would block forever."""
        fifo = tmp_path / "malicious.fifo"
        os.mkfifo(fifo)
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(fifo)])
        assert result.exit_code != 0
        assert "not a regular file" in result.stderr.lower() or "regular" in result.stderr.lower()

    def test_rejects_directory(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(tmp_path)])
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_rejects_nonexistent_path(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(tmp_path / "ghost.txt")])
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_regular_file_accepted(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        f = tmp_path / "hello.txt"
        f.write_bytes(b"hello muse")
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", "--json", str(f)])
        assert result.exit_code == 0
        data = json.loads(result.output)
        assert data["object_id"].startswith("sha256:")
        assert len(data["object_id"]) == 71

    def test_symlink_to_regular_file_accepted(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Symlinks to regular files are followed — consistent with git hash-object."""
        real = tmp_path / "real.txt"
        real.write_bytes(b"real content")
        link = tmp_path / "link.txt"
        link.symlink_to(real)
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(link)])
        # By design: hash-object follows symlinks to regular files.
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_symlink_to_nonexistent_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        link = tmp_path / "dangling.txt"
        link.symlink_to(tmp_path / "ghost.txt")
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(link)])
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_very_long_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """A 100 000-char path argument must not stack-overflow — it simply won't exist."""
        long_path = f"{tmp_path}/{'a' * 100_000}"
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", long_path])
        # The file doesn't exist so exit code is non-zero — no crash.
        assert result.exit_code != 0
        assert "exit_code" not in result.output  # no Python traceback leaked

    def test_write_stores_object_in_repo(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        f = tmp_path / "data.bin"
        f.write_bytes(b"secret content")
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["hash-object", "--write", "--json", str(f)],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0
        data = json.loads(result.output)
        assert data["stored"] is True

    @pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="block devices not on Windows")
    def test_rejects_char_device(self) -> None:
        """/dev/null is a char device — must be rejected."""
        null_dev = pathlib.Path("/dev/null")
        if not null_dev.exists():
            pytest.skip("/dev/null not available")
        result = runner.invoke(cli, ["hash-object", str(null_dev)])
        assert result.exit_code != 0


# ===========================================================================
# 4. ls-files — prefix injection
# ===========================================================================


class TestLsFilesPrefix:
    def test_null_byte_in_prefix_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        _make_commit(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["ls-files", "--path-prefix", "src/\x00malicious"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_glob_star_in_prefix_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        _make_commit(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["ls-files", "--path-prefix", "src/*.py"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_clean_prefix_accepted(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        _make_commit(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["ls-files", "--path-prefix", "file_"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_empty_prefix_returns_all(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        _make_commit(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["ls-files", "--path-prefix", ""],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        # Empty prefix is valid and returns all files.
        assert result.exit_code == 0


# ===========================================================================
# 5. check-attr — traversal, null bytes, absolute paths, CRLF stdin
# ===========================================================================


class TestCheckAttrSecurity:
    def _repo_with_attrs(self, root: pathlib.Path) -> pathlib.Path:
        _init_repo(root)
        (root / ".museattributes").write_text(
            '[rules]\n[[rules.entries]]\npath_pattern = "*"\ndimension = "*"\n'
            'strategy = "auto"\ncomment = ""\n',
            encoding="utf-8",
        )
        return root

    def test_traversal_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "../../../etc/passwd"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0
        out = result.stderr
        assert "traversal" in out.lower() or "invalid" in out.lower()

    def test_null_byte_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "foo\x00../../etc/passwd"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_absolute_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "/etc/passwd"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_ansi_escape_in_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """ESC[31m in a path argument must be rejected before it reaches output."""
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "\x1b[31mmalicious\x1b[0m"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_valid_path_accepted(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "tracks/drums.mid"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_very_long_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        long_path = "a/" * 2500  # > 4096 chars
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", long_path],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_crlf_stdin_stripped(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """CRLF-terminated stdin lines must not embed \\r in path strings."""
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        # "tracks/ok.mid\r\n" — the \\r must be stripped before path use.
        crlf_input = "tracks/ok.mid\r\n"
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "--stdin"],
            input=crlf_input,
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0
        # The path in output must not contain \\r.
        assert "\r" not in result.output

    def test_10k_paths_stress(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """10 000 valid paths must be processed without crash or timeout."""
        self._repo_with_attrs(tmp_path)
        paths = [f"track_{i:05d}.mid" for i in range(10_000)]
        stdin_data = "\n".join(paths)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "--stdin"],
            input=stdin_data,
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0


# ===========================================================================
# 6. check-ignore — same surface as check-attr
# ===========================================================================


class TestCheckIgnoreSecurity:
    def _repo(self, root: pathlib.Path) -> pathlib.Path:
        _init_repo(root)
        # .museignore is TOML format — not a gitignore-style file.
        (root / ".museignore").write_text(
            '[global]\npatterns = ["build/", "*.bin"]\n',
            encoding="utf-8",
        )
        return root

    def test_traversal_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "../../../etc/passwd"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_null_byte_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "build/\x00../../etc/cron.d/malicious"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_absolute_path_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "/absolute/path"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_valid_path_accepted(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "build/output.bin"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_crlf_stdin_does_not_embed_cr(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        crlf = "build/out.bin\r\n"
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "--stdin"],
            input=crlf,
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0
        assert "\r" not in result.output

    def test_dotdot_in_middle_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        self._repo(tmp_path)
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-ignore", "build/../../../etc/shadow"],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0


# ===========================================================================
# 7. verify-object --stdin — CRLF line endings
# ===========================================================================


class TestVerifyObjectStdinCRLF:
    def test_crlf_id_rejected_cleanly(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """A CRLF-terminated object ID must produce a clear error, not a crash."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        content = b"test content"
        oid = blob_id(content)
        write_object(tmp_path, oid, content)

        # Pass the ID with a trailing \\r before the newline.
        crlf_input = f"{oid}\r\n"
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["verify-object", "--stdin"],
            input=crlf_input,
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        # After the fix: \\r is stripped, so the ID is valid and the object passes.
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_lf_only_works(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        content = b"lf content"
        oid = blob_id(content)
        write_object(tmp_path, oid, content)

        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["verify-object", "--stdin"],
            input=f"{oid}\n",
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0


# ===========================================================================
# 8. apply_mpack / unpack-objects — zip-slip via manifest keys
# ===========================================================================


class TestPackZipSlip:
    def _minimal_bundle(self, manifest: Manifest) -> MPack:
        snap_id = compute_snapshot_id(manifest)
        snap_dict = SnapshotDeltaDict(
            snapshot_id=snap_id,
            parent_snapshot_id=None,
            delta_upsert=dict(manifest),
            delta_remove=[],
        )
        return MPack(
            commits=[],
            snapshots=[snap_dict],
            blobs=[],
            tags=[],
            branch_heads={},
        )

    def test_traversal_key_in_manifest_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """apply_mpack must reject manifests with ../../ traversal keys."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        mpack = self._minimal_bundle({"../../etc/cron.d/malicious": "a" * 64})
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        # The snapshot must be skipped — not written.
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 0

    def test_absolute_key_in_manifest_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Manifest keys starting with / must be rejected."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        mpack = self._minimal_bundle({"/etc/passwd": "a" * 64})
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 0

    def test_null_byte_key_in_manifest_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        mpack = self._minimal_bundle({"tracks/\x00malicious": "a" * 64})
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 0

    def test_invalid_object_id_in_manifest_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Manifest values must be valid 64-hex object IDs."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        # Craft mpack manually — compute_snapshot_id rejects invalid OIDs.
        # _apply_snapshot_deltas will also raise when it calls compute_snapshot_id
        # on the reconstructed manifest, so snapshots_written stays 0.
        snap_dict = SnapshotDeltaDict(
            snapshot_id=fake_id("invalid-snap"),
            parent_snapshot_id=None,
            delta_upsert={"file.py": "not-a-valid-oid"},  # type: ignore[typeddict-item]
            delta_remove=[],
        )
        mpack = MPack(
            commits=[],
            snapshots=[snap_dict],
            blobs=[],
            tags=[],
            branch_heads={},
        )
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 0

    def test_clean_manifest_written(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """A manifest with valid keys and IDs must be written successfully."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        mpack = self._minimal_bundle({"src/main.py": long_id("b" * 64)})
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 1

    def test_100_malicious_keys_all_skipped(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Stress: 100 bundles each with a traversal key — all must be rejected."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        skipped = 0
        for i in range(100):
            manifest: Manifest = {f"../../malicious_{i}": "a" * 64}
            mpack = self._minimal_bundle(manifest)
            result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
            skipped += result["snapshots_written"]
        assert skipped == 0

    def test_malicious_object_id_in_pack_rejected(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """An object payload with a non-hex 'object_id' must be rejected by write_object."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        from muse.core.mpack import BlobPayload
        bad_obj = BlobPayload(object_id="../../etc/malicious", content=b"payload")
        mpack = MPack(
            commits=[], snapshots=[], blobs=[bad_obj], tags=[], branch_heads={}
        )
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        # The blob must be skipped (write_object raises ValueError on bad ID).
        assert result["blobs_written"] == 0

    def test_unpack_objects_core_with_traversal_manifest(
        self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path
    ) -> None:
        """Core apply_mpack rejects traversal manifest keys from any mpack source."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        mpack = self._minimal_bundle({"../../malicious": "a" * 64})
        result = apply_mpack(tmp_path, mpack)
        # The traversal manifest key must cause the snapshot to be skipped.
        assert result["snapshots_written"] == 0


# ===========================================================================
# 9. Integration: full pipeline with adversarial inputs
# ===========================================================================


class TestEndToEndAdversarial:
    def test_hash_object_write_then_ls_files(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Write a real object, commit it, list it — no traversal at any step."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        f = tmp_path / "song.mid"
        f.write_bytes(b"\x00" * 128)  # synthetic MIDI-like content
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["hash-object", "--write", str(f)],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code == 0

    def test_check_attr_stdin_mixed_good_and_bad(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Mixed stdin with one traversal path must reject the whole batch cleanly."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        (tmp_path / ".museattributes").write_text(
            '[rules]\n[[rules.entries]]\npath_pattern = "*"\ndimension = "*"\n'
            'strategy = "auto"\ncomment = ""\n',
            encoding="utf-8",
        )
        mixed_stdin = "tracks/good.mid\n../../../etc/passwd\ntracks/also_good.mid\n"
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", "--stdin"],
            input=mixed_stdin,
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        # The batch must be rejected as soon as the bad path is encountered.
        assert result.exit_code != 0

    def test_no_sensitive_data_in_error_output(self, tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
        """Error messages for traversal attempts must not echo the full attack string."""
        _init_repo(tmp_path)
        (tmp_path / ".museattributes").write_text(
            '[rules]\n[[rules.entries]]\npath_pattern = "*"\ndimension = "*"\n'
            'strategy = "auto"\ncomment = ""\n',
            encoding="utf-8",
        )
        attack = "../../../etc/passwd"
        result = runner.invoke(
            cli, ["check-attr", attack],
            env=_env(tmp_path),
        )
        assert result.exit_code != 0
        # The error output must not contain raw control sequences or leak
        # system paths (the path is echoed, but sanitize_display must strip it).
        assert "\x1b" not in result.output